|GROUP | iB |

DarkPath scammers & Scam ads in social media

About Group-IB



Group-IB is one of the global leaders in providing high-fidelity Threat Intelligence and anti-fraud solutions

EUROPOL

INTERPOL

Official EUROPOL and INTERPOL partner

osce

Recommended by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

Member of the World Economic Forum and International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC)

1000+

successful investigations worldwide, including 150+ high-profile cases \$300 mln

was returned to our clients thanks to Group-IB's efforts

Forrester Gartner

According to Forrester and Gartner, Group-IB Threat Intelligence is among the best services of its kind in the world BUSINESS INSIDER

One of the top 7 most influential cyber security companies according to Business Insider UK

IDC

Leader of the Threat Intelligence Market



FROST & SULLIVAN

Bloomberg

DARKReading

Forbes

Esquire



Media coverage:




theguardian





Over the last three years, the number of users of social networks has increased by almost a billion.





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Scam ads in social media

History of scam



2021

Emails

Sites

Traffic attraction SEO, Advertisement

Mobile

Mobile applications

2010

5% web traffic mobile users



56% web traffic mobile users


Only 8% of users time

Benefits of mobile targeting



- Personal
- More targeted
- Fast decision
- Hard to verify





Benefits of social networks



- Easy
- Scalable
- Distributed
- Fail-safe
- Almost undetectable
- Everybody uses it and uses a lot
- Trustworthy
- User has no chance to verify






Damage




- Distrust to the brand
- Inflation of the ad price
- Wrong customer journey




Social network advertising spending in the United States from 2016 to 2022 (in billion U.S. dollars)

Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/736971/social-media-ad-spend-usa

Targeting







\$1 for 500 views

5% conversion

\$0.04 per click

\$450 daily budget for new accounts

How it can be used



- Data collection
- Fake promo
- Phishing
- Information attacks
- 3rd party promotion
- Scam
- Online Shopping
- Romance scams
- Economic relief scams
- Income opportunity scams
- Grant money
- Giveaways
- Multi-level marketing MLM
- Pyramid schemes
- Blessing circles/gifting schemes
- Recruiting scam



0	Contact: @Contact971 @Contac	Follow
9	Contacts @Contact8908 @Kontak	Follow
0	Contact: @Contact18142* @Kontak	Follow
9	Contact @Contact12607 @Kontaku	Follow
9	Contact @Contact54427 Contact	Follow
0	Contact @Contact Contact	Follow
9	Contact @Contact20262 Contact	Follow
9	Contact @Contact5576 Contact:	Follow
0	Contacti @Contacti184	Follow
0	Contact: @Contact7054: @ antai	Follow
9	Contact @VentusH64 Conta	Follow
9	Contact @Contact2938c. Contac	Follow
9	Contact067 @Contact067	Follow
0	Contac @Contact1515	Follow
0	Contact @Contact4166/ Contact	Follow
9	Contac @Contact60. Contac	Follow
9	Contac @Contact4410 Contac	Follow
9	Contact @Contact274 Contac	Follow
9	Contactu @Contact0920 @Montas	Follow

Numbers



200

fake accounts

190

fake pages (sites)

1-2 days

each campaign duration

6 months

total attack duration

1 mln visitors

for 1 website



Numbers




Figures based on fraud reports directly to the FTC indicating a monetary loss where the method of contact was specifically identified as social network, and reports where the method of contact was not specified, specified as internet, or consumer initiated contact, if the comments field also included mention of Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Reddit, Snapchat, TikTok, TumbIr, Twitter, or YouTube. The analysis excludes reports categorized as complaints about social networking services, internet information services, mobile text messages, and unsolicited email.

https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/data-spotlight/2020/10/scams-starting-social-media-proliferate-early-2020



50%
Instagram scam rise in 2020 in the UK



Facebook's continued reliance on a small army of low-paid, unempowered contractors to manage a daily onslaught of ad moderation and policy enforcement decisions

Facebook created a financial symbiosis with scammers, hackers, and disinformation peddlers who use its platforms to rip off and manipulate people around the world.

In the weeks leading up to voting day, Facebook moved some of its ad monitors off their usual tasks to focus on helping political advertisers buy as much inventory as they wanted


It earned more than \$50 million in revenue over two years from a single shady San Diego marketing agency that ripped off Facebook users by tricking them into hard-to-cancel subscriptions and investment scams

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DarkPath scammers


Expectation





Reality





Traffers' business example

Ideas

Ideas



```
! "#$%&' %() *+#), (-) %./
           ! "#$%#"&' %()
   Black Friday offer
 ! ! "#$%&'(#)'*+,,-.%
 ! /-0".12"1\\$'3-2, "1*#\\-1*
 ! 45&-1"*'6"7-.""."$"#*"
      *+, %#"-, ./, 0%(.1+&2&)
 ! 89: #1; '-77434#$'3#2, #4<1
 ! =">'?9, .-(+3%
 ! ?92#**'2"(4#', .-2-\( \mathbb{H}\)-1
      3%4, .5, 67"#, .', #5&+47
 ! @#;"'2"(4341"
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 ! B"$"6.4%) , .-(+3%*
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:83.(); **.<

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                 8' #+$7#5&+#9: .#+%;;"<)
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                  =, (, -\%' #.(, 0\%(.#+\%;;"<)
            /.-+, *'-1'F-34#$'G''(4#
             C(0".%4*41<'1"%>-.;*
           ! H2#4$'*"1(9-+%*A'''%3E
                      >%+4.#+%;;"<)
Ideas
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           ! | --.>#)*
           ! F,#2
           ! F>#2,41<A'''%3E
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Leads

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! J", +\\#\\\\-1\#\$'\#\\\\\\#3:\*
               (, 0\%)
! K5C'-.'K5G
! G#1#<"2"1%7""
               @+,:)
   J''*''$\\\1<'\\.\#7743'L6.->*''.'
   1-%743#%4-1*A', +*&'#$''.%*A'
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! : #(', .-(+3%*'*''\$\$41<

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67' 1(-%5#3.

Scheme: the Health Day case



67'1(-%5#3

```
$"'1.9#8*'1()*.
       :83.(); '*.<
! "#$%&' %() *+#), (-)%./
           !"#$%#"&' %()
   Black Friday offer
 ! ! "#$%&'(#)'*+,,-.%
 ! /-0".12"1\\$'3-2, "1*\$-1
 ! 45&-1"*'6"7-.""."$"#*"
      *+, %#"-, ./, 0%(.1+&2&)
 ! 89: #1; '-77434#$'3#2, #4<1
 ! =">'?9, .-(+3%
 ! ?92#**'2"(4#',.-2-\\|-1
     3%4, .5, 67"#, .', #5&+47
 ! @#;"'2"(4341"
 ! @#;"1">* 3\\\43; \\64\\\*
 ! B"$"6.4%),.-(+3%*
```

```
='(>)*?.9#7)4"'*.
         :(*1@d *.<
 ! ((*18(-)%#), (-)%./
      8' #+$7#5&+#9: .#+%;;"<)
 C(+$\%'>"6*4\%''*
! D1$41"9, 4.#3)'>"6*4%"*A'''%3E
       =, (, -\%' #.(, 0\%(.#+\%;;"<)
  /.-+, *'-1'F-34#$'G''(4#
  C(0".%4*41<'1"%>-.;*
 H2#4$'*''1(9-+%*A'''%3E
           >%+4.#+%;;"<)
  : -%1''%*
    --.>#)*
```


F>#2,41<A'''%3E

```
?((, 0%()
   5&4*&41<
   F3#2'#1('7.#+(
   G#$>#."'417"3%-1
  J", +\#\%-1\#\$'\#\\\\#3; *
               (,0\%)
! K5C'-.'K5G
  G#1#<"2"1%7""
               @+,:)
   J''*''$\\\1<'\\.\#7743'L6.->*''.'
   1-%743#%-1*A', +*&'#$''.%*A'
   ."(4."3%*M
   : #(', .-(+3%*'*''$\1<
   5#4('*+6*3.4, %-1*
```

A)%'(-B-%5#(+, '

The Health day






- Distributed network of 134 fraudulent websites
- Is aimed at **millions** of users worldwide
- Directing traffic to fraudulent sites

Viral distribution of multistage scheme






Personalised content based on:


- Geolocation
- User agent
- Language settings

The language and currency of the reward varies depending on the location of the user



Viral distribution of the multistage scheme





Further redirect:

- Fake giveaways
- Luring to a plug-in site
- Installations of a browser extension
- Ending up on a malware or phishing site.

Sophisticated & distributed scam infrastructure





134 domains were a part of a larger fraudulent network.


Around **200 000** people per day were attracted. Within a week, they were visited by **1.4 million** potential victims.

Often complicate the detection by using CDN services.


134 rogue websites impersonating popular brands and organisations

Worldwide distribution





Luxemburg



Congratulations!

(con Annexes any Celebration® 28 CO.

Congratulations!

(con Annexes any Celebration® 28 CO.

Congratulations!

(con Annexes any Celebration® 28 CO.


Congratulations 2 Congratulations 20 CO.

Through the questionnare, you will have a chance to get \$ 2000.

Counstion 1 of 4 : Do you know 27 Yes.

Counstion 1 of 4 : Do you know 27 Yes.

USA




France Philippines

Signs of the attack



- Newly created accounts with branded userpics and a few posts
- Accounts with mistypes in the name
- Consonant domain names
- Reports on similar activity in the industry
- Social media tweets and posts


Recommendation: try to understand the attack fully



Response




- Only social media administration can block it
- Violation can be not active anymore
- Better to have registered trademark
- Visibility of the full scheme helps a lot in response
- The proper approach is constant monitoring and response to prevent



Key thoughts

- Monitoring landscape should be constantly being expanded
- Build the customer working reporting process
- Scammers are evolving and growing
- Industry is growing very fast
- If the brand is global attack will be global too
- Sophisticated attacks stay below the radar
- Partial visibility can solve only the part of the problem





Preventing and investigating cybercrime since 2003



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